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1.4.2 Network Simulation Example 
	
The	second	method	is	based	on	modeling	of	complex	cyber	and	other	systems	as	
interconnected	networks,	where	a	failure	in	one	sector	can	cascade	to	other	dependent	
networks	and	assets	(Vespignani,	2010).	This	is	a	reasonable	assumption	for	ICS	networks;	
for	example,	a	disruption	of	the	electrical	grid	can	directly	impact	dependent	sectors	such	
as	the	network	controlling	ICS	devices	leading	to	a	cascade	of	failures	as	it	is	believed	to	
have	happened	during	the	Italian	blackout	in	2003	(Buldyrev	et	al.,	2010).	Thus	the	
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assessment	of	the	security	of	a	single	ICS	network	should	be	viewed	in	the	context	of	a	
larger	network	of	interdependent	systems.	
	
Ganin	et	al.	(2015)	took	this	network‐oriented	view	in	developing	a	methodology	to	
quantitatively	assess	the	resilience	(and	thus	security)	of	networked	cyber	systems.	They	
built	upon	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences	(2012)	definition	of	resilience	as	a	system	
property	that	is	inherently	tied	to	its	ability	to	plan	for,	absorb,	recover	from,	and	adapt	to	
adverse	events.	In	order	to	capture	the	state	of	the	system	the	authors	propose	to	use	the	
concept	of	critical	functionality	defined	as	a	time‐specific	performance	function	of	the	
system	considered	and	derived	based	on	the	stakeholder’s	input.	For	instance	in	the	
network	of	power	plants,	the	critical	functionality	might	represent	the	total	operational	
capacity.	In	the	network	of	computers	it	might	represent	the	fraction	of	servers	and	
services	available.	Values	of	critical	functionality	are	real	numbers	from	0	to	1.	Other	key	
elements	to	quantify	resilience	are	the	networked	system’s	topology	and	dynamics;	the	
range	of	possible	adverse	events	(for	example,	a	certain	damage	to	nodes	of	the	network);	
and	the	control	time	TC	(that	is	the	time	range	over	which	the	performance	of	the	system	is	
evaluated).	Then	the	dependency	of	the	critical	functionality	(averaged	over	all	adverse	
events)	over	time	is	built.	Ganin	et	al.	(2015)	refer	to	this	dependency	as	the	resilience	
profile.	As	it	is	typically	computationally	prohibitive	or	not	possible	at	all	(in	case	of	
continuous	variables	defining	nodes’	states)	to	consider	all	the	ways	an	adverse	event	can	
happen,	it	is	suggested	to	utilize	a	simulation	based	approach	with	Monte‐Carlo	sampling.	
	
Given	its	profile	in	normalized	time	(where	time	TC	is	taken	to	be	1),	the	resilience	of	the	
network	can	be	measured	as	the	area	under	the	curve	(yellow	region	in	Figure	2).	This	
allows	mapping	of	the	resilience	to	real	values	ranging	between	0	and	1.	
Another	important	property	of	the	system	is	obtained	by	finding	the	minimum	of	the	
average	critical	functionality.	Some	researchers	refer	to	this	value	as	robustness	M	
(Cimellaro	et	al.,	2010),	while	Linkov	et	al.	(2014)	note	that	1	–	M	corresponds	to	the	
measure	of	risk.	
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	Figure	2:	A	generalized	resilience	profile,	where	a	system’s	resilience	is	equal	to	the	area	below	the	
critical	functionality	curve	(adapted	from	Ganin	et	al.,	2015).	
	
	
In	their	paper	Ganin	et	al.	(2015)	illustrated	the	approach	on	a	directed	acyclic	graph.	Each	
level	in	this	graph	represents	a	set	of	nodes	from	certain	infrastructure	system	(e.g.	
electrical	grid,	computers	etc.).	Nodes	of	different	levels	are	connected	by	directed	links	
representing	a	dependency	of	the	destination	node	on	the	source	node.	In	the	simplest	case	
a	node	in	a	certain	level	requires	supply	(or	a	dependency	link)	from	a	node	in	each	of	the	
upper	levels	and	does	not	depend	on	any	nodes	in	the	lower	levels.	Other	parameters	of	the	
model	include	node	recovery	time	(TR)	–	a	measure	of	how	quickly	a	node	can	return	to	an	
active	state	after	it’s	been	inactivated	as	a	result	of	an	adverse	event;	redundancy	(pm)	–	the	
probability	controlling	the	number	of	additional	potential	supply	links	from	upper	levels	to	
lower	levels;	and	switching	probability	(ps),	controlling	ease	of	replacement	of	a	disrupted	
supply	link	with	a	potential	supply	link.	These	parameters	could	be	extended	to	other	
situations	to	inform	how	a	system	may	display	resilient	behavior,	and	thus	increasing	the	
security	of	the	system	as	a	whole.	
	
The	authors	found	that	there	is	strong	synergy	between	pm	and	ps;	increasing	both	factors	
together	produces	a	rapid	increase	in	resilience,	but	increasing	only	one	or	the	other	
variable	will	cause	the	resilience	metric	to	plateau.	Resilience	is	strongly	affected	by	the	
temporal	switching	time	factor,	TR.	This	temporal	factor	determines	the	characteristics	of	
the	recovery	phase	and	has	a	greater	impact	on	the	calculated	resilience	than	does	the	
potential	increase	in	redundancy.	This	is	particularly	true	when	the	switching	probability	
ps	is	low.	An	important	long	term	challenge	is	to	model	adaptation,	which,	according	to	the	
National	Academy	of	Sciences,	is	part	of	the	response	cycle	that	follows	restoration	and	
includes	all	activities	that	enable	the	system	to	better	resist	similar	adverse	events	in	the	
future.	
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Ganin	et	al.	(2015)	note	that	the	main	advantages	of	the	approach	include	its	applicability	
to	any	system	that	can	be	represented	as	a	set	of	networks.	Also	both	the	resilience	and	the	
robustness	of	a	system	are	metricized	using	a	real	value	in	range	between	0	and	1	(where	1	
corresponds	to	the	perfect	resilience	or	robustness)	making	comparison	of	resilience	of	
different	systems	easy.	On	the	other	hand	mapping	the	resilience	property	of	a	system	to	a	
single	value	necessarily	shadows	some	system’s	important	characteristics	(for	instance,	the	
rate	of	recovery).		The	resilience	profile	could	be	used	as	a	more	holistic	representation	of	
the	system’s	resilience	noting	that	even	in	that	case	only	the	average	value	of	critical	
functionality	(at	each	time	step)	is	taken	into	account.	To	fully	describe	a	system	one	
should	consider	the	distribution	of	the	value	of	critical	functionality	(at	each	time	step)	for	
different	initial	adverse	events.	Finally,	it	is	not	possible	to	simulate	all	adverse	events	from	
the	range	used	to	estimate	resilience	and	the	approach	is	Monte‐Carlo	based.	It	means	that	
in	order	for	the	results	to	be	reliable	the	number	of	simulations	is	typically	required	to	be	
very	high.	
	
1.5 Tips for Generating Metrics  
	
1.5.1 Generalized Metric Development Process 
	
The	following	process	towards	the	development	of	metrics	is	adapted	by	McKay	et	al.	2012.		
1. Objective	Setting:	Articulate	clear,	specific	goals.	This	should	be	done	in	a	structured	
manner.	Gregory	and	Keeney	(2002)	outline	a	structured	approach	to	do	this.	
a. Write	down	all	of	the	concerns	that	the	project	team	feels	is	relevant.	
b. Convert	those	concerns	into	succinct	verb‐object	goals	(e.g.,	minimize	downtime).		
c. Next,	these	should	be	organized,	often	hierarchically,	separating	goals	which	
represent	means	from	those	which	represent	ends.		
d. Finally,	review	and	clarification	should	be	conducted	with	the	project	team.	This	
may	be	an	iterative	process.		
2. Develop	Metrics:	Once	the	objectives	are	clearly	articulated	and	organized,	metrics	can	be	
formally	developed.	
a. The	first	step	is	to	select	a	broad	set	of	metrics,	which	may	be	selected	from	existing	
lists	or	guidelines,	or	created	by	a	project	team	or	subject	matter	experts	for	the	
particular	purpose	at	hand.	This	step	is	where	the	Resilience	Matrix	could	facilitate	
metric	development.	
b. Next,	this	set	of	metrics	should	be	evaluated	and	screened	to	determine	whether	it	
meets	the	project	objectives	and	the	degree	to	which	the	metrics	meet	the	desirable	
qualities	of	metrics,	explained	earlier	in	this	chapter.	At	this	stage,	remaining	
metrics	can	be	prioritized.		
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c. Finally	the	remaining	metrics	should	be	documented,	including	assumptions	and	
limitations,	and	other	supporting	information.	
3. Combination	and	Comparison:	A	method	should	be	developed	for	how	the	metrics	will	
ultimately	be	used	to	support	decision	making	and	drive	action.	Some	methods	include:	
a. Narrative	Description:	Simple	techniques	where	trade‐offs	may	be	simple	such	as	
listing	evidence	or	best	professional	judgement.	
b. Arithmetic	Combination:	Simple	mathematical	techniques	for	combining	dissimilar	
metrics	such	as	simple	aggregation	of	metrics	with	similar	units	(e.g.,	cost),	
converting	to	similar	units	(e.g.,	monetization),	or	normalizing	to	a	similar	scale	
(e.g.,	0	to	1).	
c. Multi‐Criteria	Decision	Analysis:	A	method	for	weighting	and	scoring	dissimilar	
decision	criteria	based	on	their	relative	importance	and	performance	with	respect	
to	an	objective.	
d. Interdependent	Combination:	For	systems	that	are	complex,	usually	involving	
intricate	internal	relationships,	more	intensive	modeling	efforts	may	be	necessary,	
such	as	Bayesian	networks	or	other	complex	systems	modeling	techniques.	
The	above‐mentioned	process,	along	with	a	solid	metric	development	process,	can	greatly	
aid	in	devising	effective	metrics.	Often	it	is	necessary	to	develop	a	conceptual	model	of	the	
system	in	order	to	identify	the	functional	relationships	and	critical	elements	and	processes	
within	a	system.	This	can	be	done	using	a	Network	Science	approach	described	above.	
	
1.5.2 Best Practices in Metric Development and Validation 
	
Validation	of	metrics	is	an	often	overlooked	aspect	of	the	metric	development	process.	
Neely	et	al.	(1997)	provide	some	questions	to	ask	regarding	whether	the	output	from	the	
metrics	is	appropriate,	specifically	whether	the	metrics	have	a	specific	purpose,	are	based	
on	an	explicit	formula	and/or	data	source,	and	are	objective	and	not	based	solely	on	
opinion	(Neely	et	al.,	1997).	Similarly,	Eckerson	(2009)	lays	out	a	series	of	questions	that	
can	serve	as	a	quality	check	on	developed	metrics,	to	ensure	that	they	are	of	high	quality:	
•	Does	it	link	to	strategy?	
•	Can	it	be	quantified?	
•	Does	it	drive	the	right	behavior?	
•	Is	it	understandable?	
•	Is	it	actionable?	
•	Does	the	data	exist?	
	
Regarding	the	number	of	metrics	necessary,	it	isn’t	necessarily	the	quantity	of	metrics	that	
constitute	a	successful	implementation,	but	whether	these	metrics	are	collectively	
comprehensive	enough	to	address	everything	deemed	important	(McKay	et	al.	2012).		
Eckerson	(2009)	recommends	that	a	set	of	metrics	be	sparse,	since	with	a	limited	number	
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of	metrics	it	is	easier	to	analyze	how	metric‐level	changes	drive	the	performance	in	the	
system,	as	well	as	the	practical	fact	that	gathering,	synthesizing,	and	presenting	multiple	
data	streams	often	takes	quite	some	time.	More	granular,	process‐level	metrics	may	still	be	
required	however,	and	Eckerson	(2009)	proposes	a	MAD	(monitor,	analyze,	drill)	
framework	for	presenting	different	levels	of	resolution	to	different	users	of	that	
information.	
	
Another	ongoing	element	of	validation	is	traceability,	as	evidenced	in	the	framework	
presented	by	Neely	et	al.	(1997),	which	includes	a	list	of	information	(known	as	the	
performance	measure	record	sheet)	such	as	how	often	data	is	to	be	collected,	and	by	
whom,	as	well	as	important	questions	such	as	“who	acts	on	the	data?”	and	“what	do	they	
do?”.	If	these	questions	are	considered	and	answered	as	the	need	arises,	it	is	known	who	is	
responsible	for	making	the	measurement	and	what	actions	are	to	be	taken	as	a	result.	This	
can	reveal	insight	into	the	metric	and	how	they	are	measured	and	being	utilized,	not	just	
for	the	current	project	but	for	future	reference.	An	item	on	the	list	asks	what	the	metric	
“relates	to.”	This	can	assist	in	entering	the	mindset	of	approaching	metrics	with	an	
interconnected	and	goal‐oriented	viewpoint.		
	
Other	validation‐related	efforts	include	standardizing	methods	for	ICS	metric	development	
and	implementation,	as	well	as	institutionalizing	a	clear	means	to	integrate	metrics	with	
decision	analytic	tools	to	support	the	risk	management	process.	Finally,	given	the	dynamic	
nature	of	cyber	threats,	periodic	review	and	updating	of	ICS	metrics	should	be	conducted	to	
keep	abreast	of	the	latest	developments	in	the	field.	
1.6 Conclusions 
Despite	existing	guidelines	and	frameworks,	designing	and	managing	for	security	in	cyber‐enabled	
systems	remains	difficult.	This	is	in	large	part	due	to	the	challenges	associated	with	the	
measurement	of	security.		A	critical	element	in	eliciting	a	meaningful	metric	is	in	gathering	the	
relevant	information	about	one’s	system	and	aligning	that	metric	with	measurable	goals	and	
strategic	objectives.		For	ICSs,	time,	safety	and	continuation	of	services	factor	considerably	into	
overall	goals,	since	many	systems	are	in	a	position	where	a	failure	can	result	in	a	threat	to	human	
lives,	environmental	safety,	or	production	output.		Often	it	is	necessary	to	develop	a	conceptual	
model	of	the	system	or	develop	a	standardized	list	of	questions	or	topics	helps	to	identify	critical	
process	elements,	the	functional	relationships	and	critical	elements	and	processes	within	a	system.		
In	this	chapter,	we	discuss	in	detail	two	approaches	for	the	generation	of	broadly	applicable	
security	and	resilience	metrics	and	their	integration	to	quantify	system	resilience.	The	first	method	
is	a	semi‐quantitative	approach	in	which	the	stages	of	the	event	management	cycle	(plan/prepare,	
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absorb,	recover,	and	adapt)	are	applied	across	four	relevant	domains	(physical,	information,	
cognitive,	social),	forming	a	matrix	of	potential	security	metrics.	Second	is	a	quantitative	approach	
based	on	Network	Science,	in	which	features	such	as	network	topologies	can	be	modeled	to	assess	
the	magnitude	and	responsiveness	of	the	critical	functionalities	of	networked	systems.	Validation	of	
metrics	is	an	often	overlooked	aspect	of	the	metric	development	process;	however	a	series	of	
questions	can	serve	as	a	quality	check	on	developed	metrics,	to	ensure	that	they	are	of	high	quality.	
	
Permission	was	granted	by	the	USACE	Chief	of	Engineers	to	publish	this	material.	The	views	and	
opinions	expressed	in	this	paper	are	those	of	the	individual	authors	and	not	those	of	the	US	Army,	
or	other	sponsor	organizations.	
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